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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of the
developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions.  The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Macroeconomic and
Development Policies Branch, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce a
development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research carried out under the project is coordinated by Professor Dani Rodrik,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The research papers are
discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings of  the G-24 Technical Group,
and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers and Deputies in their preparations
for negotiations and discussions in the framework of the IMF’s International Monetary
and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) and the Joint IMF/IBRD
Development Committee, as well as in other forums. Previously, the research papers for
the G-24 were published by UNCTAD in the collection International Monetary and
Financial Issues for the 1990s.  Between 1992 and 1999 more than 80 papers were
published in 11 volumes of this collection, covering a wide range of monetary and financial
issues of major interest to developing countries. Since the beginning of 2000 the studies
are published jointly by UNCTAD and the Center for International Development at
Harvard University in the G-24 Discussion Paper Series.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and the Governments of
Denmark and the Netherlands, as well as contributions from the countries participating
in the meetings of the  G-24.THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE
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Abstract
This paper looks at the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the evolving global
financial system from the perspective of developing country interests. It finds that on certain
issues, such as the scope and purposes of its lending operations, a consensus has been reached
that IMF should continue to serve all its members, including the poorest, and that its resources
should be available for supporting macro-relevant structural reforms as well as for dealing
with financial crises.
On a number of other issues, there remain differences between industrial and developing
country views, including on the extension of IMF surveillance to cover the observance of
international standards and codes. Largely unsettled are the modalities of the involvement of
the private sector in crisis resolution, with special reference to the development of arrangements
in the international sphere that would be analogous to domestic bankruptcy procedures, including
the declaration of standstills and principles for orderly and equitable debt workouts. The
liberalization of the capital account and the choice of exchange regimes are two interconnected
areas in which international prescriptions conflict with developing country insistence on the
preservation of national autonomy and in favour of intermediate regimes, as opposed to corner
solutions. The scope and content of IMF conditionality raises the issue of how to reconcile it
with the importance of assuring country ownership.
Finally, the governance of IMF poses questions about the exercise of decision-making powers
in the institution. Developing country positions are evolving in all these areas, especially on the
subject of private-sector involvement in financial crisis prevention and resolution. However,
there appears to be a general preference for a more rules-based framework, rather than one
derived on a “case-by-case” basis.
There are four areas of great interest to developing countries where the international debate
has remained muted or has been largely absent in the recent literature: these relate to the
surveillance over, and coordination of, the macroeconomic policies of the three principal
international currency issuers; the relationship of international and regional arrangements;
the distribution of voting power in both IMF and the international system generally, and the
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I. Introduction
A worldwide debate on the operations of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its future role
has been under way in the wake of the financial cri-
sis in Mexico in 1994/95, followed in 1997/99 by a
succession of crises affecting countries in South-East
Asia, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation
and Brazil. Most of the countries involved were in
the developing or transition economies – an excep-
tion being the collapse of an important hedge fund
in the United States in the second half of 1998, which
directly threatened international financial markets
and forced the Federal Reserve to intervene to pre-
vent a global meltdown. It might therefore appear
natural for much of the subsequent discussion to fo-
cus on the prevention and resolution of financial
crises in affected countries, and especially on a sub-
set of those with closer connections with international
capital markets, namely the emerging market econo-
mies. Much less attention has been directed to the
reform of policies and arrangements in the major
industrial countries, where changes in interest rates
and exchange rates generate powerful effects on the
rest of the world. Nor has much emphasis been placed
on structural deficiencies in the working of financial
markets and the transmission mechanism between
them, on herd behaviour, asymmetric information and
overshooting proclivities that have produced such a
devastating impact on previously fast growing, dy-
namic economies.
A great deal of literature has been produced in
the past few years by both official and non-official
sources on crisis prevention and management prob-
lems in emerging market countries. A certain degree
of consensus has been reached on etiology and the
prescriptions for prevention of financial crises, and
there is a better understanding of the principal issues
that remain in contention as these apply to develop-
ing countries (Mohammed, 2000). There is less
agreement on what needs to be done for the resolu-
tion of crisis, once it breaks out. Large differences
of view persist on the role to be assigned to the inter-
national institutions, especially IMF, between those
preoccupied with moral hazard concerns and others
willing to consider a more ambitious agenda of in-
tervention. There remain complex issues relating to
the participation of the private sector in financial
crisis management; measures for improvements in
the working of financial markets and the governance
of the international financial institutions. In all these
areas, a variety of proposals have emanated from
individual governments, intergovernmental groups
and non-governmental expert bodies. The discussions
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reached a certain culmination in the proposals en-
dorsed at the G-7 Economic Summit held in Japan,
in July 2000, on the basis of several reports submit-
ted to the Summit leaders by the G-7 Ministers of
Finance.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
section II identifies issues in the area of financial
architecture, where there appears to be an emerging
consensus in the international community; section III
reviews issues that remain in contention from the
viewpoint of developing countries; section IV enu-
merates some unresolved issues pertaining to the role
of the major developed countries in the international
financial system; section V summarizes develop-
ments since the last G-7 Economic Summit.
II. Issues approaching consensus
The scope of IMF lending operations was one
of the issues under debate where a consensus appears
to have been attained. It will be recalled that the
majority report of the Meltzer Commission (IFIAC,
2000)2 had proposed to restrict the IMF role to that
of a “quasi-lender-of-last resort” providing very
short-term, essentially unconditional, liquidity sup-
port for a limited number of relatively strong emerg-
ing market countries that would have pre-qualified
for IMF assistance. The Commission also wanted to
eliminate the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facil-
ity (PRGF). A number of academic and other non-
governmental groups have similarly argued for tak-
ing IMF out of the poverty alleviation business,
whereas developing countries wanted to maintain
IMF role in all member countries, including in the
poverty reduction area. The G-7 Economic Summit
leaders endorsed the proposition that “as a universal
institution, IMF must work in partnership with all its
members, including the poorest, based on shared in-
terests”.3 The G-7 Finance Ministers took an even
stronger line in their report to the Summit leaders by
emphasizing that IMF had a critical role to play in
supporting macroeconomic stability in the poorest
countries, through the PRGF, integrating its efforts
with those of the World Bank (Report of G-7 Finance
Ministers, Fukuoka, 8 July 2000, para. 6g). The
World Bank was recognized as “the central institu-
tion for poverty reduction”, but IMF’s “responsibil-
ity” for macroeconomic stability was stated to be a
“key tool for the achievement of poverty reduction
and growth” (ibid.). Whether this attempt to define
the respective responsibilities and activities of IMF
and the World Bank Group in the poverty reduction
area is clear enough remains to be seen. Much will
depend on how rapidly the latter institution can fash-
ion and implement a lending instrument that would
complement the PRGF.
Another area where consensus is indicated re-
lates to the purposes for which IMF can lend. Here
the discussion has been in terms of the reform of
“IMF facilities”. The Extended Fund Facility (EFF)
that provides 10-year loans in support of structural
adjustment measures was the main target of criticism.
Conservative critics like the majority in the Meltzer
Commission wanted to restrict IMF to short-term
crisis lending. A number of academic and NGO
groups also argued that IMF should not engage in
longer-term lending, nor condition its lending to
wide-ranging structural reforms that are said to lie
beyond its macroeconomic stabilization and finan-
cial stability mandates and expertise. The G-7
Ministers did not accept this position. They expected
the EFF to “be used in well-defined cases where
medium-term structural reform is important, and
longer-term maturity is appropriate due to the coun-
try’s structural balance-of-payments situation and its
limited access to private capital” (ibid.). How these
circumstances are defined and implemented in the
Fund’s operations remains to be seen, but at least the
principle that developing countries can have access
to longer-term IMF funding in support of structural
reforms has been recognized. There are other types
of limitations envisaged by the G-7 to discourage
prolonged use of IMF resources that bear on this sub-
ject and carry potential for disagreement.
Also agreed in the area of IMF Facilities is the
need to improve the Contingent Credit Line (CCL)
through more automatic procedures for its activation
so as to reassure the markets that resources under
the facility would be available, at least for an initial
drawing, without a review process or an abbreviated
one. There also appears to be broad agreement with
G-7 proposals for reducing the rate of charge and
the commitment fee. However, there remain unre-
solved questions about the strictness of the eligibility
requirements and also the risks to a member of be-
ing asked to exit from the CCL if IMF found that the
eligibility criteria were no longer being met.
Turning to the scope and content of IMF sur-
veillance, while there are several issues to be placed
in the contentious category, the G-7 statement that
“strong surveillance must be at the centre of IMF’s
efforts to strengthen the world economy and the in-
ternational financial architecture”(ibid.) leaves little3 The Future Role of the International Monetary Fund
room for doubt that this central activity applies to all
members of IMF. This language should put at rest
the misgivings associated with the Meltzer Commis-
sion’s recommendation that OECD countries be
exempted from the obligations of surveillance. How
effectively surveillance works in practice to influ-
ence exchange rate, interest rate and related policies
in the major industrial countries remains one of the
unresolved issues of the system.
On the issue of transparency as it applies to IMF,
the project currently under way indicates that most
members are prepared to have public information
notices (PINS) released at Executive Board discus-
sion of their countries following Article IV consul-
tations. Similarly, there is broad acceptance to the
release of IMF policy documents, and in several re-
cent instances (e.g. the draft on the establishment of
an Independent Evaluation Office) public comment
has been sought prior to the taking of final decisions
by the Executive Board. The G-7 clearly wishes to
press the transparency initiative further by support-
ing “the principle” of the release of IMF Article IV
staff reports as well as the Reports on the Observ-
ance of Standards and Codes (ROSCS). However,
the Financial System Stability Assessments (FSAA)
prepared under the “pilot” Financial Sector Assess-
ment Programme (FSAP) have not been released.
On the complex issues surrounding the involve-
ment of the private sector in the prevention and
resolution of financial crises, there is broad agree-
ment that its participation is essential and that, in the
interest of minimizing moral hazard, the official com-
munity should not provide such large “packages” of
funding as would enable the private sector to exit
during a crisis. The major question still to be an-
swered is how that participation is to be ensured.
An area where a consensus appeared to have
been reached at one stage relates to the selection of
the Managing Director of IMF. A press release au-
thorized by the Executive Board, while it was still in
the midst of the selection process declared that this
was a “very important decision”; that the decision
would have to be based on a discussion of “the ex-
ceptional qualities that the next MD will require”,
and that “the process of choosing the best person for
the job from the possible candidates will, through
the Board, involve all members of the Fund”.4 The
Executive Boards of IMF and the World Bank Group
subsequently established working groups to review
the process for the selection of their respective chief
executives; their reports were to be submitted to the
next meeting of their respective Boards of Gover-
nors. However, no such reports were forthcoming at
the Prague Annual Meetings, and there is some indi-
cation of a loss of interest in the subject on the part
of the major shareholders.
III. Issues in contention
This section reviews issues that remain in con-
tention from a developing country point of view.
Among them, the following are examined:
• Extension of the surveillance exercise to cover
the implementation of international standards
and codes;
• Modalities for the involvement of the private
sector in crisis resolution with special reference
to “standstills” and debt workouts;
• Pricing of IMF non-concessional facilities;
• Liberalization of the capital account and choice
of exchange regimes;
• The content of IMF conditionality and its bear-
ing on country ownership; and
• Governance of IMF.
A. Fund surveillance
There has been a steady extension of the ambit
of Fund surveillance beyond its traditional concern
with macroeconomic conditions and monetary, fis-
cal and exchange rate policies in individual member
countries and with the functioning of the international
monetary system. The rapid growth of private capi-
tal flows and the series of financial crises associated
with massive reversals of such flows has focused
attention on financial sector issues, with special em-
phasis on the need for better identification of sources
of vulnerability and measures to prevent the emer-
gence of crises. The G-7 Finance Ministers expect
IMF “in conducting its surveillance work, [to] con-
tinue to sharpen its focus on macroeconomic policy,
capital flows and structural issues which have an
impact on macroeconomic stability, in particular in
the financial sector, and on exchange rates with a
view toward encouraging countries to avoid unsus-
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asked for a qualitative shift in the nature and scope
of IMF surveillance to prevent crises and expressed
determination to strengthen efforts to implement in-
ternational codes and standards, “including through
their incorporation in IMF surveillance”.5 While
welcoming the development of “codes, standards and
best practices”, developing countries have been
equally emphatic that “the scope of surveillance
should not be extended to cover the observance of
such codes and standards, which should remain a
voluntary choice by each member”.6 In an earlier
communique, the G-24 Ministers had explained their
reservations by noting that assessment of practices
in these areas “should take fully into account their
institutional capacities and stage of development, so
as not to place developing countries at a compara-
tive disadvantage”. They also warned that increased
attention given to these matters would be “accept-
able as part of Fund surveillance as long as it remains
within the core competencies of the Fund and
subscription to international standards remains
voluntary”.7 These cautions indicate that while de-
veloping countries are prepared for IMF and the
World Bank to help them prepare Financial Sector
Assessments under the FSAP project and for IMF to
develop internationally agreed standards in areas of
core competence (such as data dissemination, fiscal
transparency and transparency in monetary and fi-
nancial policies), they are less prepared to have IMF
surveillance extended to monitoring their observance
of standards or to be measured against them. This
reluctance applies especially strongly to areas be-
yond IMF’s traditional expertise, such as securities,
investment funds, insurance, accounting, auditing and
corporate governance. While IMF management has
offered assurances that it would work closely with
the World Bank Group and other institutions, includ-
ing standard-setting bodies, and that the preparation
of financial sector assessments would be carried out
in a phased manner, the insistent tone of industrial
country pronouncements8 leaves much uncertainty
as to how these assurances will apply in practice.
Another set of apprehensions relates to how
much disclosure of surveillance judgements is to be
required. The United States Secretary of the Treas-
ury has argued that the focus of surveillance “should
shift from collecting and sharing information within
the club of nations to promoting the collection and
dissemination of information for markets and in-
vestors”.9 Developing countries argue that as a
cooperative of governments, IMF cannot be expected
to serve as a super-rating agency for the benefit of
private markets, nor should it issue public warnings
that are likely to become self-fulfilling prophecies.
B. Private-sector involvement
As noted earlier, the official community is
agreed that the private sector should participate in
the prevention as well as the resolution of financial
crises. On the prevention side, the major question
raised by developing countries relates to the disclo-
sure practices of financial institutions, especially in
relation to their funding of the activities of highly
leveraged institutions (HLI), such as hedge funds and
their operations in offshore financial centres, where
a significant proportion of unregulated hedge funds
are located. The recommendations in these interre-
lated areas have been the subject of studies by the
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) Working Groups and
are largely of a self-regulating character. The G-7
Ministers were not prepared to recommend “at this
stage, direct regulation of the currently unregulated
HLIs”, indicating their desire to propitiate private
financial interests in their own markets. The trans-
parency obligations and regulatory restraints being
applied to developing countries are not balanced by
a commensurate application to institutions whose
operations have generated such disruptive market
dynamics in other countries’ markets. Indeed, the
need for transparency extends beyond these marked
institutions to the actions of those who regulate them
and to the decision makers who frame the environ-
ment within which both operate.
On the crisis resolution side, there is a whole
skein of issues. The fundamental one, however, is
whether private-sector involvement should be based
on the use of concerted techniques applied under a
rules-based framework or should be decided on a
“case-by-case” basis. But the choice between the two
approaches does not run along a North-South divide.
A number of European countries and Canada favour
clear rules determining when the private sector is to
be “bailed in”. Others (including the United States)
argue for “constructive ambiguity”.10 The former
group would establish a presumption that concerted
private-sector involvement would be required if IMF
resources needed for dealing with a financial crisis
exceed some pre-specified limits on members’ cu-
mulative access to Fund credit. Use of IMF resources
beyond such limits would be conditioned on the im-
position of a standstill analogous to one that features
in most domestic bankruptcy proceedings. The pos-
sibility of the debtor country being able to declare a
standstill, together with some form of official ac-
knowledgement, is seen as essential for bringing
otherwise recalcitrant creditors to the table for
negotiations. Those opposed to establishing a pre-5 The Future Role of the International Monetary Fund
dictable framework are concerned that, apart from
adversely affecting the efficient operation of inter-
national capital markets, it might accelerate a “rush
for the exits” by creditors and impede a resumption
of spontaneous market access by the country con-
cerned, as well as producing adverse spill-over effects
for other countries. While developing countries have
not yet articulated a common position, the interests
of smaller countries would indicate a preference for
a rules-based framework. This would constitute an
important step towards developing in the interna-
tional sphere a bankruptcy regime similar to the one
existing in the domestic arena. Another step would
be to generalize the incorporation of collective ac-
tion clauses in international sovereign bond contracts
– a possibility now available for certain issuances
on the London market.11
Beyond the issue of standstill lies the bigger
one concerning the arrangements for orderly and
equitable debt workouts. Where the problem is es-
sentially one of liquidity (here defined to mean where
a rapid return to market access on reasonable terms
is deemed likely), it might be sufficient to arrange
for debt rollovers with the help of an IMF-supported
programme that serves a catalytic function. Where
the prospects for a rapid return are poor (owing ei-
ther to the country’s own situation or because the
markets are disturbed), it would be necessary to visu-
alize debt restructuring and, in extreme cases, debt
write-offs. IMF’s role as a “gate-keeper” for Paris
Club debt reorganizations is well established and has
been strengthened in the context of the HIPC Initia-
tive. This role, however, is concerned with sover-
eign debt and where the credits are officially granted
or officially guaranteed. The IMF role is far more
problematic when it is dealing with private-sector
creditors and claims a “preferred creditor” status in
relation to them. Developing countries have insisted
on the principle that IMF should not become a party
to the negotiations between the debtor country and
its private creditors.12
Developing countries tend to be generally un-
convinced that the official community will be able
to overcome the powerful resistance of private-sec-
tor interests to concerted techniques for involving
them. They would much rather that IMF were
equipped with an emergency facility that could de-
cisively underpin confidence in the international
system when confronting speculative excesses in
private capital markets. In a world where these mar-
kets can mobilize enormous sums in very short order
to attack any country’s currency, IMF could succeed
in facing down market speculators only if it had the
power to create international reserves freely through
a prototype SDR mechanism.13 While these argu-
ments are made in the context of helping individual
member countries subjected to speculative attack, a
more nuanced position has been offered by the former
IMF Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, who
proposed that in the event of a “systemic credit
crunch” IMF should be authorized “to inject addi-
tional liquidity – and to withdraw it when the need
has passed – in a manner analogous to that of a na-
tional central bank, through the creation and selective
allocation of SDRs” (Camdessus, 2000). The Inde-
pendent Task Force of the Council on Foreign
Relations proposed a Contagion Facility “that would
be funded by pooling a one-off allocation of SDR”
(CFR, 1999).14
C. IMF facilities
Several issues in this area were settled, as noted
earlier. Some new ones arose, however, from G-7
demands for giving “priority to early progress in
achieving a streamlined, incentive-based structure for
IMF lending that encourages countries to develop
stable access to private capital markets on a sustain-
able basis” (CFR, para. 9, fn. 5). To this end:
… the new pricing structure should establish
more consistent objectives across facilities …
discourage prolonged use of, and deter inap-
propriate large-scale access to, IMF resources,
thus contributing to their more efficient use.
For all non-concessional facilities, the inter-
est rate should increase on a graduated basis
the longer countries have IMF resources out-
standing. The possibility of adding a premium
when the scale of financing goes beyond cer-
tain thresholds should be explored. In addi-
tion, for countries that continuously resort to
IMF facilities, the IMF should make more in-
tensive use of prior actions and limit access to
its resources.
They also ask for “steps to encourage early re-
purchases once the IMF borrowers have returned to
a sustainable economic and financial path” (CFR,
paras. 11(a) and (b)). This set of proposals for tight-
ening the terms of IMF credit are ostensibly directed
to ensuring that Fund financing is not treated as a
cheaper substitute for available market financing and
in order to delay adjustment. Developing countries
consider the rationale offered to be unconvincing and,
since changes in the terms of IMF credit require a
qualified majority of 70 per cent to be enacted, they
would be able to block the G-7 proposals, provided6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 11
they maintain solidarity (see the concluding section
to this paper).
Developing countries are even less persuaded
by another proposal of the G-7 Finance Ministers,
viz. the call “to explore appropriate use of any re-
sulting increase in IMF income within the existing
framework of the Articles with the objective of tar-
geting support to poorest countries” (ibid., para.
11(c)). The effect of this recommendation would be
to shift the burden of helping the poorest of the de-
veloped member countries to those somewhat less
poor. It would be tantamount to repealing an implicit
contract that underpins the weighted voting power
that the rich countries exercise in IMF, namely that
this “democracy deficit” is justified by the contribu-
tion that the richer countries are expected to make
for providing resources to IMF, particularly conces-
sionary resources.15
D. Capital-account liberalization and the
choice of exchange regime
The major issue in contention is the degree of
national autonomy that countries exercise in regard
to the management of their capital accounts. A pow-
erful campaign launched in the mid-1990s, with
strong ideological overtones, for an IMF-supervised
regime reached its peak in 1997 when the Interim
Committee resolved to invest the institution with
statutory authority to promote capital liberalization.
This push lost momentum following the experience
with the massive volatility of private capital move-
ments in the 1997/99 period that created enormous
havoc in a succession of emerging market countries.
The IMF has subsequently qualified its advocacy
with cautions about the process being gradual, or-
derly and properly sequenced. There is particular
emphasis on having in place a strong regime of pru-
dential regulation and supervision of domestic
financial systems, as well as equally strong liability
management policies aimed at producing sustainable
debt ratios and debt profiles covering external and
domestic currency debt of both the private and pub-
lic sectors. As regards capital inflows, there is greater
acceptance of the need to deter large-scale, short-
term capital inflows with the help of indirect,
price-based, policy tools, such as the reserve require-
ments used by Chile and Colombia in recent years.
There is less agreement on whether direct adminis-
trative controls are desirable, although these might
be acceptable in the case of underdeveloped regula-
tory systems. In the case of capital outflows, there is
a tendency to consider them as unworkable, espe-
cially if they are introduced during a crisis. Ocampo
has argued that “a permanent system of capital-
account regulation which can be strengthened or
loosened throughout the business cycle is preferable
to the alternation of free capital movements during
booms and quantitative controls during crisis”.16
Moreover, any use of concerted techniques for in-
volving the private sector in crisis resolution would
have to provide for the suspension of debt-service
payments, including through the application of ex-
change controls on private-sector payments.
The importance of maintaining national au-
tonomy in the choice of exchange regime also bears
on the management of the capital account. Develop-
ing countries are being pushed, on the basis of the
“impossible trinity” argument to choose between
“corner” solutions: either free floats or currency
board arrangements. Yet most developing countries
continue to operate intermediate regimes, and there
are grounds on which such choices can be justified.17
In any event, such intermediate regimes would have
a better chance of operating successfully in tandem
with capital-account regimes that allow for capital
controls, whether of a price-based or administrative
character. Developing countries would favour an
acceptance by IMF of the possibility of using capital
controls as a regular instrument of national policy,
instead of treating them as temporary devices to deal
with emergency situations in countries with poor
prudential regulations.
E. Conditionality and country ownership
This has been a traditional area of contention,
and the controversies have intensified in the wake of
IMF interventions in the East Asian countries, Bra-
zil and transition countries. In addition to questions
about the correctness of technical conditions (e.g.
overemphasis on fiscal retrenchment, balance-of-
payments adjustment biases at the expense of growth
and social spending, and insistence on structural
measures beyond those required for macroeconomic
stabilization), developing countries have argued that
new conditions of a political economy character re-
lating to governance (rule of law, judiciary reforms,
civil society participation, etc.) have represented an
unwarranted invasion of national sovereignty (Kapur
and Webb, 2000). The number and variety of condi-
tions applied have created great difficulty in meeting
them and tended to delay disbursements. There has
been a greater willingness on the part of IMF man-7 The Future Role of the International Monetary Fund
agement to streamline conditions and to restrict struc-
tural conditions to those essential measures that are
“macro-relevant” and within the Fund’s core area of
responsibility.
The debate has moved further, with a good deal
of new thinking on whether conditionality under-
mines “ownership” of programmes by the borrow-
ing country, thereby contributing to programme fail-
ure. While the fiduciary responsibility of IMF to safe-
guard the use of its resources leaves the institution
little choice in the matter, there is scope for putting
greater effort into fostering country ownership by
assuring a more active involvement of the authori-
ties in the diagnosis and prescription of measures to
resolve the problem that led to their approaching IMF
in the first place. Such an approach would be pre-
cluded in the presence of crisis situations but, pro-
vided the country makes a timely approach, a nego-
tiating process that allows for serious consideration
of alternative designs and time-paths for the imple-
mentation of an adjustment programme would ap-
pear to be an essential reform of IMF practice.
F. Governance of IMF
There are several issues in contention, of which
perhaps the single most significant one is the influ-
ence of developing countries in IMF’s decision-
making process. The original concept of IMF as a
cooperative institution has eroded as industrial coun-
tries have not needed to borrow from it – a conse-
quence of the growth of global capital markets. With
the membership split between “structural” creditors
and “structural” debtors, the former group has felt
no compunctions about elaborating conditions to be
applied to the latter group, since they were unlikely
to apply them to themselves. A manifestation of this
tendency has been the growing arrogation of deci-
sion-making by smaller groups of industrial coun-
tries (notably the G-7), which are then pushed through
IMF on the basis of weighted voting power.18 This
has been seen, for example, in the 1999 Economic
Summit decisions relating to the enhancement of the
HIPC Initiative; these were pushed through the Ex-
ecutive Boards of the Bretton Woods institutions,
despite the fact that the enhancement added to the
costs of the Initiative for these (and other multilat-
eral) institutions (as well as other creditor govern-
ments), and the G-7 made no commitments of their
own on how these costs would be met. Even more
striking was the use of unusually strident language
in the Report of the G-7 Finance Ministers presented
at their meeting at Fukuoka in July 2000. In a pre-
amble to the Report, the Ministers state that they “are
determined to implement all the measures in this re-
port, as well as the broad range of measures endorsed
at the Cologne Summit” (italics added).While this
sentence was followed by a reference to working
together with other members of the international com-
munity, the context suggested that this would be for
the purpose of making “steady progress” towards
implementing their decisions.
Substantial changes in IMF governance would
probably require an amendment of the Articles,  but
there is little possibility of such an amendment pass-
ing the United States Congress that would result in a
surrender of its veto power. There could be other
changes, however, in constituency representation on
the Executive Board that might be contemplated as
an act of international solidarity through (say) the
western European countries agreeing to cede one or
more of their Chairs (they now occupy eight) to (say)
the sub-Saharan African countries, which must now
make do with only two Chairs to represent some
40-plus member countries. A more significant change
could come about from a reallocation of quota shares
on the basis of radical changes in the formulae for
the calculation of quotas, e.g. by moving to purchas-
ing-power-parity exchange rates instead of market
exchange rates for converting the chosen variables
to a common denominator.19 Another possibility
would be to formulate group-focused (rather than
country-focused) criteria for quotas, such as was done
at the time it was decided to raise the quotas of OPEC
members in the 1970s. A group criterion could, for
example, take into account the degree of volatility in
private capital movements and/or the extent of inte-
gration into global capital markets as variables in
order to give greater weight to the emerging-market
economies, whose problems constitute such an im-
portant part of IMF work in a world that will continue
to be dominated by global capital markets.8 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 11
IV. Issues relating to industrial
countries
This paper has focused on IMF issues that have
direct impact on developing countries. There is, how-
ever, another set of issues that cover the relations of
IMF with its major shareholders, and that are nota-
ble for their absence from the current discussions
but which have an indirect impact on the developing
world – issues such as:
• The global implications of exchange rate move-
ments of the principal international currencies,
namely the dollar, the euro and the Japanese
yen, and the fact that their fluctuations are ma-
jor contributors to financial disturbance in other
countries. It has been noted that every emerg-
ing market crisis in the past two decades has
been associated with big swings of exchange
rates and liquidity conditions in the major in-
dustrial countries.20 Gyrations of up to 20 per
cent between bilateral exchange rates of the
three currencies have taken place within the
span of a few months or even a few weeks. Other
countries are simply expected to accommodate
themselves to such large movements. The lack
of stable arrangements to assure the coherence
of the macroeconomic policies of the major
countries remains an important lacuna in the
international monetary and financial system;
• The relationship of international and regional
institutions for surveillance, mutual financial
support and decision-making – especially in
crisis situations – is another area that calls for
discussion in light of changing political reali-
ties, such as the hardening of attitudes in the
United States Congress towards IMF and other
international institutions and the example set
by the formation of a single currency area on
the European continent. The Japanese proposal
in 1997 for the creation of an Asian monetary
fund was too hastily withdrawn, and while there
has been some evidence of a revival of the con-
cept in recent days, it needs to be developed to
be meaningful. Similar arrangements might be
worthy of consideration in Latin America, the
Middle East (e.g. in the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil countries) and in North Africa;
• The exercise of voting power within IMF, as
determined by the distribution of quotas that
derives historically from an arbitrary quota al-
location formula designed to perpetuate the
dominance of a few industrial countries (Buira,
1999), has important implications for the inter-
nal governance of that institution and, through
that, on the governance of the international
monetary system. The issue is broader, how-
ever, when one considers the power alignments
across international institutions with overlap-
ping mandates and operations, including the
World Bank Group, the World Trade Organiza-
tion, the Bank for International Settlements, the
Basel Committees and the more recently estab-
lished Financial Stability Forum. The relation-
ship of the treaty-based institutions with defined
rights and obligations of members versus ad hoc
groupings, such as the Canadian-chaired Group
of Twenty, raises important questions on the
influence exerted by a small subset of the mem-
bership. It also raises pertinent questions regard-
ing the protection of minority rights in interna-
tional institutions that are duly recognized when
applied to the sphere of corporate governance;
• The international reserve mechanism and its
current heavy reliance on a very few national
currencies. While the debates of earlier decades
on the supposed “benefits” obtained by the
currency issuers may have lost some of its rel-
evance, there remains an outstanding question
about the role of the SDR mechanism in an
evolving global system in need of a genuine
international lender-of-last-resort.
V. Conclusions
Decisions taken at the G-7 Economic Summits
tend to set the agenda for subsequent work at IMF.
The Ministerial meeting of the International Mon-
etary and Financial Committee (IMFC), held in
Prague after the Okinawa Summit, largely endorsed
many of the proposals agreed there, leaving to the
Executive Board the formulation of decisions and
implementation guidelines with regard to Fund Fa-
cilities and related matters. In order to ensure that
countries do not rely on Fund resources for exces-
sively long periods, the Board decided to introduce
time-based repurchase expectations ,while leaving
unchanged the period when repurchase obligations
become due. For purchases in the credit tranches,
members would be expected to begin repurchase two
and a quarter years after each purchase and to com-
plete repurchases after four years. Under the EFF,
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pectations, starting from four and a half years and
ending seven years after each purchase. While mem-
bers would be expected to repurchase within a shorter
period, a member could obtain an extension if the
Board agreed that the member’s external position was
not sufficiently strong for it to repay early without
undue hardship or risk.
The IMF Board also introduced surcharges that
would apply to the amount outstanding above a
threshold level, in order to discourage unduly large
use of Fund resources. The use of credit above 200
per cent of a member’s quota would carry a surcharge
of 100 basis points above the regular rate of charge,
and the surcharge would rise to 200 basis points for
use of credit above 300 per cent of quota. The sur-
charges would not be changed for a period of at least
four years; this was a major concession obtained by
developing countries.
To encourage access to the CCL, the commit-
ment fee was held to a uniform 25 basis points for
amounts up to 100 per cent of quota that could be
purchased over any 12-month period, and 10 basis
points on amounts exceeding 100 per cent of quota.
On actual use of credit under the CCL, the surcharge
over the regular rate of charge would be 150 basis
points initially, and would rise by 50 basis points
one year from the date of the first purchase under
the facility and every six months thereafter, until it
reached a maximum of 350 basis points. Thus the
surcharge on use of CCL would remain, at all times,
150 basis points lower than the surcharge that would
be applicable under the Supplementary Reserve Fa-
cility (SRF). This is expected to give members an
incentive to apply for the CCL instead of waiting
until a crisis forced them to use the more expensive
SRF. Other inducements included a presumption that
a member should normally be able to draw one third
of the total commitment of resources once activa-
tion was approved. No member has applied to date
for the CCL.
The Fund clarified that the EFF would be
granted only in cases where there is a reasonable
expectation that the member’s balance-of-payments
difficulties would be relatively long-term, including
because it had limited access to private capital, and
where there was an appropriately strong structural
reform programme to deal with embedded institu-
tional or economic weaknesses. While the EFF was
deemed to be especially appropriate for graduating
PRGF and some transition countries that did not have
enough access to capital markets, it was confirmed
that the EFF remained available to all members.
Finally, on the use of Fund resources, it was
agreed that when a member’s credit outstanding in
the General Resources Account (GRA) exceeded a
threshold of 100 per cent of quota, there should be a
presumption that the member would engage in Post-
Programme Monitoring (PPM) by the Fund after the
expiration of its arrangement. This would involve
more frequent consultation with the Fund (than that
which is normal under Article IV), with particular
focus on macroeconomic and structural policies, and
would include the submission of a quantified macro-
economic framework.
A major shift in the focus of IMF bilateral sur-
veillance has been under way in the wake of the
Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) that
is jointly run by IMF and the World Bank Group.
The prevention of financial crises is now placed at
the heart of the surveillance exercise for emerging
market countries, with increasing emphasis on iden-
tifying sources of vulnerability and on financial sector
and financial market issues. In the joint FSAP un-
dertaking, IMF is responsible for Financial System
Stability Assessments (FSSA), and these are to be
integrated with Article IV consultations. These as-
sessments also cover the monitoring of observance
of international standards, codes and best practices;
they are designed to help countries to evaluate their
own systems against international benchmarks, to
identify vulnerabilities and gaps in regulatory struc-
tures and practices, and to indicate medium-term
reform and development needs and priorities. A new
item that has been added to the Fund’s agenda is work
on financial abuse, particularly money-laundering.
Much less progress has been made in develop-
ing the framework for the involvement of the private
sector in the prevention and resolution of crises. The
forum for broader discussion of financial architec-
ture reform issues has apparently been moved from
the Bretton Woods Institutions to the Group of
Twenty.21 However, preliminary work has continued
at IMF on such operational issues as the merits of
alternative “standstill” provisions, the restructuring
of international sovereign bonds, out-of-court cor-
porate workouts and the comparability of treatment
between official bilateral and private creditors.
Finally, on quotas and the related issue of rep-
resentation that are central to the internal governance
of IMF, progress has been minimal. A notable devel-
opment was the recommendation by the Executive
Board to the Board of Governors for an ad hoc in-
crease in the quota of China following the return of
Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. The Chinese10 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 11
quota would increase to SDR 6369.2 billion (from
SDR 4687.2 billion) – a figure identical to that of
Canada, the member with the smallest quota in the
G-7 Group.
Notes
1 There are four reports, entitled: (i) Strengthening the In-
ternational Financial Architecture; (ii) Poverty Reduction
and Economic Development; (iii) Actions Against Abuse
of the International Financial System, and (iv) Impact of
the Information Technology Revolution on the Economy
and Finance.
2 However, four members of the Commission had taken an
opposing view on this, as on other subjects.
3 See G-7 Statement, Okinawa, 21 July 2000 (para. 8).
4 IMF Press Release No. 99/56 of 23 November 1999.
5 Op. cit., para. 8. The language in this context is quite pon-
tifical: “We are determined to strengthen our efforts to
this end….”.
6 G-24 Communique (April 15, 2000), para. 14.
7 G-24 Communique (22 September 1999).
8 Note, for instance, the statement delivered to the Royal
Economic Society on 13 July 2000 by the Chancellor of
the Exchequer of the United Kingdom and the Chairman
of the IMFC that internationally agreed codes of conduct
“will only work if there is an effective and authoritative
surveillance mechanism … The building block is already
present in IMF Article IV process to which all IMF mem-
ber states are committed by their treaty obligations. It [sur-
veillance] must become broader, encompassing not just
macroeconomic policy but the implementation of the codes
and standards on which stability depends”.
9 Speech delivered by Lawrence Summers at the London
Business School on 14 December 1999.
10 Speech delivered at the International Law Association Bi-
ennial Conference in London, 26 July 2000.
11 The G-7 Finance Ministers recommended the use of col-
lective action clauses in bonds issued in their own finan-
cial markets. They also asked the World Bank and other
multilateral development banks to have such clauses used
in international sovereign bonds or loans for which they
provide a guarantee.
12 See speech by Dr. German Suarez, President of the Cen-
tral Reserve Bank of Peru and Chairman of the G-24 at
the inauguration of the Twelfth Technical Group Meeting
of the G-24, Lima, 1 March 2000. He would expect IMF
“to play the role of a facilitator – and not an arbiter – for
an agreement between debtor countries and [their] pri-
vate commercial creditors”.
13 The case for such a mechanism has been made in papers
prepared for the G-24 Research Programme. See Ahluwalia
(1999) and Mohammed (1999): both papers envisaged that
SDR allocations created for emergency lending would be
cancelled once the emergency ended.
14 Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force
Report on The Future of the International Financial Ar-
chitecture, New York, September, 1999.
15 In a moment of candor, the Managing Director of IMF, in
answering questions at the National Press Club in Wash-
ington, stated that the prospects of implementing the pro-
posed changes were not promising “because a big group
of countries within the Fund feel lectured [to] by the pres-
entation of these ideas” (IMF, 2000).
16 See paper (mimeo) by Jose Antonio Ocampo, Executive
Secretary of ECLAC, entitled “Recasting the international
financial agenda”.
17 See IMF Survey (28 August 2000) reporting on Jeffrey
Frankel’s search for the “missing middle”. See also
Williamson (2000).
18 The group may become even smaller when the United
States Congress legislates on the governance of IMF, and
the other members of the G-7 are required to fall in line in
order to obtain Congressional consent to an IMF quota
increase, which requires a qualified majority of 85 per
cent of total votes, and the United States exercises a veto
with its 17.29 per cent share in total votes. A similar veto
applies to other major decisions, i.e. the sale of IMF gold,
SDR allocations and amendment of the Articles of Agree-
ment.
19 A Quota Formula Review Group (QFRG) of experts was
commissioned by IMF under the chairmanship of Profes-
sor Richard Cooper of Harvard University and reported
in April 2000. The QFRG proposed simplifying the cur-
rent system of five variables into a formula consisting of
only two variables: one indicating a country’s ability to
contribute to the Fund’s resources, represented by the GDP
variable; and the other a country’s external variability, rep-
resented by the variability of current receipts and of net
long-term capital flows. The Group was unable to agree
on the relative weights to be assigned to each, and some
members wanted to add a third variable: openness, repre-
sented by average current payments and receipts, supple-
mented by direct investment flows (see QFRG Report,
IMF, 19 September 2000).
20 See remarks (mimeo) by Yilmaz Akyüz, Officer-in-Charge,
UNCTAD Division on Globalization and Development
Strategies, at the Regional Preparatory Meeting on Financ-
ing for Development, Jakarta, 2–5 August 2000.
21 As reported in an Annex to the Press Release on a meet-
ing of the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Gov-
ernors, held in Montreal, Canada, 25 October 2000.
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